[TAX & LAW] 변호사(KO, USA, IL) 이재욱 Office Map
LAW OFFICE [ TAX & LAW ] 세금과 법률
I P

Hello everybody! Translate this page:

You can translate the content of this page by selecting a language in the select box. This Website provides diverse language translation by Google Translation button. You can find translation menu at the upper left corner of this website. You can select your own language for the translation of the pages you want to read in your own language.


∗ [LANGUAGE Translation] You can use Google Translate application to see in your own language the pages in this website. For your convenience, click the "Google Translate(Select Language)"

[한국변호사, 미국변호사, 일리노이 변호사, 세무사 이재욱]
[개인과 기업을 위한 모든 법률문제를 유료로만 서비스합니다. 본 사무실은 진행사건 위임의 경우를 제외하고는 무료서비스는 일체 제공하지 않습니다.] 유료서비스내역은 FEE, 상담메뉴란의 유료상담안내메(Click)를 참조하십시요.
1997년부터 20년 이상 한국과 미국의 변호사자격을 가지고 한국법과 미국법에 대한 서비스를 제공해왔습니다. 이재욱 변호사의 주요 업무분야와 업무경력을 확인하시려면 본 사이트의 상단 메뉴의 변호사이재욱의 경력란(Click) 을 참조하십시요. 본 변호사가 제공하는 서비스 업무분야는 본 홈페이지의 각 매뉴항목을 참조하십시요. 그러나, 이러한 메뉴는 업무분야의 예시에 불과하며, 귀하가 요구하는 모든 서비스도 모두 제공합니다.

∗ [LANGUAGE Translation] You can use Google Translate application to see in your own language the pages in this website. For your convenience, click the "Google Translate(Select Language)"


ATTORNEY [ licensed to practice in KOREA, U.S.A., ILLINOIS ] LEE, JAE WOOK
∗ [FOR AlienS - ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEGAL SERVICES in Counseling, Application and LITIGATION & TRIAL IN COURTS and TRIBUNALS in KOREA]
INTERNATIONAL DIVORCE, CIVIL, REAL ESTATE, PERSONAL INJURY, DAMAGES, TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, FRAUD, PENAL LAW, CRIMINAL TRIAL, FELONY, GUILTY PLEA, LEASE, RENTAL LAW, IMMIGRATION, INVESTMENT, TAX, INCORPORATION, TRADE, CONTRACT, DISPUTE IN CORPORATION, GOVERNMENT TREATMENT, REFUGEE, REMOVAL, VISA, PERMANENT RESIDENCE, CITIZENSHIP]
For more information for the services Attorney LEE provide for the Aliens who want for legal services in Korea, Please do not hesitate to click the below MENU link for "SERVICES FOR AlienS".

∗ [LANGUAGE Translation] You can use Google Translate application to see in your own language the pages in this website. For your convenience, click the "Google Translate(Select Language)"


∗ [LANGUAGE Translation] You can use Google Translate application to see in your own language the pages in this website. For your convenience, click the "Google Translate(Select Language)"

FEE
상담
소개
| 민사
LAND
금융
| TAX
조세
소송
| 행정
헌법
노동
| 병역
여권
국적
| PAT
특허
상표
| 모욕
명예
훼손
| 연예
ART
TECH
| CRIME
형사
고발
| 관세
국제
거래
| USA
이민
VISA
| 이혼
상속
가사
| Korea
Aliens
SERVICE
| |
[Category]
U.S.A. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), Deferred Action for Parents of Americans(DAPA)(미국 연방 청소년 추방연기보호법, 시민권자녀의 부모추방연기보호법)
  • 미국이민뉴스
  • U.S.A. Immigration PRACTITION TIP (미국 연방 이민 실무 Tip)
  • U.S.A. Defense Service for Immigration Fraud and Crime (미국 연방 이민 관련 범죄자 변호, 자문 서비스)
  • U.S.A. Defense Service for Immigration Application Fraud Offenders (미국 연방 이민신청 사기 범죄자 방어 변호, 자문 서비스)
  • U.S.A. C VISA (미국 연방 경유용 단기 비자)
  • U.S.A. DHS USCIS Adjudicator's Field Manual (AFM 미국 연방 국토안보부 이민국 이민심사 매뉴얼)
  • U.S.A. Department of States Foreign Affairs Manual (9 FAM VISAS of DOS. 미국 연방 주한미국대사관 영사절차 처리 매뉴얼)
  • U.S.A DOL Permanent Labor Certification Process (Program Electronic Review Management. PERM 미국 연방 노동부 취업영주권 승인 절차)
  • U.S.A. Korea-Based Consular process(DOS. 미국 연방 주한 미국 대사관 영사절차)
  • U.S.A. E1 & E2 Temporary Visa (미국 연방 투자 및 사업 단기 비자)
  • U.S.A. F visa (미국 연방 학생 비자)
  • U.S.A. H visa (미국 연방 취업 단기 비자)
  • U.S.A. J visa (미국 연방 방문 연구 단기 비자)
  • U.S.A. K visa (미국 연방 시민권자의 배우자용 결혼 단기 비자)
  • U.S.A. L visa (미국 연방 해외지사근무경험자 단기비자)
  • U.S.A. O visa & P visa (미국 연방 연예인 및 체육인 단기 비자)
  • U.S.A. R visa (미국 연방 종교 단기 비자)
  • U.S.A. S visa (미국 범죄수사협력자 단기 비자)
  • U.S.A. T Visa & U visa (미국 연방 인신매매 & 범죄피해자 보호 단기비자)
  • U.S.A. V Visa (미국 연방 영주권자의 배우자 및 가족용 결혼 단기 비자)
  • U.S.A. WAIVER for Removal by Deportability & Inadmissibility (미국 연방 입국전 및 입국후 추방 면제사유)
  • 체류기간연장(NIV EOS)
  • U.S.A. Non-Immigrant Visa Change of Status (NIV COS. 미국 연방 비이민미자 신분변경)
  • U.S.A. Removal by Inadmissibility (미국 연방 입국전 입국불허사유)
  • U.S.A. Removal by Deportability (미국 연방 입국후 거주자에 대한 추방사유)
  • U.S.A. Removal of condition for Conditional LPR( 미국 연방 조건부 결혼영주권자와 조건부 투자이민영주권자의 조건해제)
  • U.S.A. National Interest Waiver for EB-2 Immigrant Visa (NIW. 미국 연방 EB-2 이민비자 취업요건 국익면제 프로그램)
  • U.S.A. Employment-Based Immigration(미국 연방 고용이민 절차)
  • U.S.A. Family-Based Immigration(미국 연방 가족이민 절차)
  • U.S.A. Adjustment of Status to LPR (AOS. 미국 연방 신분변경에 의한 영주권 취득신청)
  • U.S.A. EB-5 Visa (미국 연방 투자이민 영주권)
  • U.S.A. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), Deferred Action for Parents of Americans(DAPA)(미국 연방 청소년 추방연기보호법, 시민권자녀의 부모추방연기보호법)
  • U.S.A. Violence Against Women Act & LPR (VAWA. 미국 연방 범죄피해여성구제법과 영주권)
  • U.S.A. USCIS Administrative Appeals Office Process (미국 연방 USCIS 행정심판소 AAO 불복 절차)
  • U.S.A. Appeal to District Court (미국 연방법원 항소 절차)
  • U.S.A. Process of Immigration Court (미국 연방 이민심판소 절차)
  • U.S.A. Board of Immigration Appeals Process (BIA. 미국 연방 이민항고심판소 절차)
  • U.S.A. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Process (DHS ICE. 미국 연방 이민 및 세관 집행부서 집행절차)
  • U.S.A Removal - Basics (미국 연방 추방 절차)
[Category]
U.S.A. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), Deferred Action for Parents of Americans(DAPA)(미국 연방 청소년 추방연기보호법, 시민권자녀의 부모추방연기보호법)


[Title]
Prosecutorial Discretion Generally
Start →

Prosecutorial Discretion Generally

The judicial branch has traditionally accorded federal prosecutors
        a) “broad” latitude
                i) in making a range of
                        A) investigatory and
                        B) prosecutorial
                                I) determinations,
                                        (a) including when, whom, and whether
                                                (i) to prosecute particular violations of federal law.39

This doctrine
        a) of “prosecutorial discretion”

1) has a long historical pedigree
        a) —the early roots
        b) of which can be traced at least to a Sixteenth Century English common law procedural mechanism
                i) known as the nolle prosequi.40

nol·le pros·e·qui
ˌnälē ˈpräsəˌkwē/
nounLAW
a formal notice of abandonment by a plaintiff or prosecutor of all or part of a suit or action.
the entry of nolle prosequi in a court record.
Nolle prosequi (/ˌnɒli ˈprɒsəkwaɪ/;[1] Classical Latin: [ˈnolːe ˈproːsekwiː])
is legal term of art and a Latin legal phrase meaning "be unwilling to pursue",[2] a phrase amounting to "do not prosecute".

It is a phrase used in many common law criminal prosecution contexts to describe a prosecutor's decision to voluntarily discontinue criminal charges either before trial or before a verdict is rendered.[3] I

t contrasts with an involuntary dismissal.
Application in law[edit]
Nolle prosequi as a declaration is most often used in criminal cases, but in jurisdictions making use of nolle prosequi in civil lawsuits, is used by a plaintiff to voluntarily drop its claims. In civil cases, a motion for voluntary dismissal may be made by a plaintiff instead of a declaration of nolle prosequi, depending upon the custom and rules of a given jurisdiction


In the early English legal system,

criminal prosecutions were generally initiated
        a) by private individuals
                i) rather than public prosecutors.

The nolle prosequi, however, allowed the government,
        a) generally at the direction of the Crown,
        b) to intervene in and
        c) terminate
                i) a privately initiated criminal action
                        A) it viewed as
                                I) “frivolous or
                                II) in contravention of royal interests.”41

The discretionary device
        a) was later adopted into American common law and
        b) has been used
                i) by prosecutors
                ii) to terminate criminal prosecutions
                        A) that are determined to be unwarranted or
                        B) which the prosecuting authority chooses not to pursue.42

Notwithstanding this historical background,

the modern doctrine
        a) of prosecutorial discretion

1) derives more from our constitutional structure
        a) than English common law.

However,

the exact justification
        a) for the doctrine

1) does not appear to have been explicitly established.

Generally,

courts have characterized prosecutorial discretion
        a) as a function of some mixture of
                i) the separation of powers,
                ii) the Take Care Clause,43 or
                iii) the duties of a prosecutor
                        A) as an appointee
                                I) of the President.44


Moreover,

both
        a) federal and
        b) state
                i) courts

1) have ruled that
        a) the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is an executive function
                A) necessary to the proper administration of justice.

Given these precedents,

prosecutorial discretion may be appropriately characterized
        a) as a constitutionally based doctrine.



39 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal justice system, the Government retains
‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.”) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 (1982)); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case…”) (citing the Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1869)).
40 See, e.g., Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Development, 6
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 19-26 (2009) (describing the English use of the nolle prosequi and its “absorb[tion]” by
American law).
41 Id. at 20.
42 See, e.g., Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1869); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“Most recently, the issue of the United States Attorney’s ‘discretionary control of criminal prosecutions has arisen in connection with the filing of a nolle prosequi, and the Courts have regularly refused to interfere with these voluntary dismissals of prosecution.’”) (citing Louis B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors’ Discretion, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 64, 83 (1948)). Today, judicial approval is generally required before a prosecutor may dismiss an ongoing prosecution. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) (“The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment,
information, or complaint.”).
43 U.S. Const. Art. II, §3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.... ”).
44 See, e.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (“They have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. at 458 (“Appointed, as the Attorney General is, in pursuance of an act of Congress, to prosecute and conduct such suits, argument would seem to be unnecessary to prove his authority to dispose of these cases in the manner proposed.... ”); Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922) (“The Attorney General is the head of the Department of Justice. He is the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the United States in protection of the interests of the United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offences
be faithfully executed.”); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (“The Attorney General is the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offenses, be
faithfully executed. Although as a member of the bar, the attorney for the United States is an officer of the court, he is nevertheless an executive official of the Government, and it is as an officer of the executive department that he
exercises discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a particular case. It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers
of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.”) (internal citations omitted)).




Regardless of its precise textual source,

courts generally will neither
        a) review
        b) nor question
                i) discretionary prosecutorial decisions,
        c) nor “coerce” the executive branch
                i) to initiate a particular prosecution.

In acknowledging the discretion
        a) possessed by enforcement officials,

1) courts have recognized that
        a) the “decision
                i) to prosecute

          is particularly ill-suited
                i) to judicial review,”
        b) as it involves the consideration of factors—
                i) such as
                        A) the strength of evidence,
                        B) deterrence value, and
                        C) existing enforcement priorities—
                ii) “not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis
                        I) the courts are competent to undertake.”45

Moreover,

the executive branch has asserted that
        a) “because the essential core
                i) of the President’s constitutional responsibility

          is the duty
                i) to enforce the laws,
        b) the Executive Branch has exclusive authority
                i) to initiate and
                ii) prosecute
                        A) actions
                                I) to enforce the laws
                                        (a) adopted by Congress.”46

An agency decision
        a) to initiate an enforcement action
                i) in the administrative context

1) “shares
        a) to some extent
        b) the characteristics
                i) of the decision
                        A) of a prosecutor
                                I) in the executive branch”
                        B) to initiate a prosecution
                                I) in the criminal context.47

Thus,

just as courts are hesitant to question a prosecutor’s decisions
        a) with respect to whether to bring a criminal prosecution,

1) so too are courts
        a) cautious in reviewing an agency’s decision
                i) not to bring an enforcement action.

In the seminal case
        a) of Heckler v. Cheney,

the Supreme Court held that
        a) “an agency’s decision
                i) not
                        A) to prosecute or
                        B) enforce,
                                I) whether through civil or criminal process,

          is a decision
                i) generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”48

The Court noted that
        a) agency enforcement decisions,
                i) like prosecution decisions,

          involve a “complicated balancing”
                i) of agency
                        A) interests and
                        B) resources
                ii) —a balancing that
                        A) the agency is “better equipped”
                                I) to evaluate
                                II) than the courts.49

The Heckler opinion proceeded to establish the standard
        a) for the reviewability
                i) of agency non-enforcement decisions,
        b) holding that
                i) an “agency’s decision
                        A) not to take enforcement action

                  should be presumed immune
                        A) from judicial review.”50

However,

the Court indicated that,
        a) in certain cases,
        b) that presumption may be overcome
        c) “where the substantive statute has provided guidelines
                i) for the agency to follow
                        A) in exercising its enforcement powers,” 51

1) as is discussed below.



45 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has observed that “the decisions of this court have never allowed the phrase ‘prosecutorial discretion’ to be treated as a magical incantation which automatically provides a shield for arbitrariness.” Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d
659, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
46 See Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 101, 114 (1984) (emphasis added). This traditional conception may, however, have been qualified in some respects following the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson, in which the Court upheld a congressional delegation of prosecutorial power to an “independent counsel” under the Ethics in Government Act. In sustaining the validity of the statute’s appointment and removal conditions, the Court suggested that although
the independent counsel’s prosecutorial powers—including the “no small amount of discretion and judgment [exercised by the counsel] in deciding how to carry out his or her duties under the Act”—were executive in that they had “typically” been performed by executive branch officials, the court did not consider such an exercise of prosecutorial
power to be “so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch” as to require Presidential control over the independent counsel. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). While the ultimate reach of Morrison may be narrow in that the independent counsel was granted only limited jurisdiction and was still subject to the supervision of the Attorney General, it does appear that Congress may vest certain prosecutorial powers, including the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, in an
executive branch official who is independent of traditional presidential controls. But see Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693 (“[T]he
Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.... ”).
47 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832. The Court also expressed concern that judicial review of agencies’ exercise of
prosecutorial discretion could impose “systemic costs” by delaying criminal proceedings, chilling law enforcement, and undermining prosecutorial effectiveness. Id. at 833.
48 Id. at 831. Accordingly, such decisions are generally precluded from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. §701 (establishing an exception to the APA’s presumption of reviewability where “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law”).
49 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.



← End



[Title]
Prosecutorial Discretion Generally



Copyright 1997-2020 TAX & LAW (세금과 법률)
본 site의 정보는 영리를 목적으로 제공하는 것이 아니며, 이곳에 등재된 모든 글은 "공개"된 대법원판례(온라인이 아니라 대법원이 종이책으로 출간한 대법원 법원공보상의 판례집)에 기한 것으로 실명과 무관합니다.
따라서, 이 곳에 기재된 대법원 판례에 혹시라도 귀하의 성명과 인적사항이 있다면, 그것은 귀하의 것이 아니며, 귀하와 동명이인이거나 가상의 인적사항이라는 점에 유의하시기 바랍니다.
그럼에도 불구하고 이를 귀하의 인적사항이라고 주장하신다면, 귀하는 본 사이트가 아니라 대법원에 그러한 점을 적시하여 공개된 (종이책으로 출간된 대법원 법원공보상의 판례집) 판례의 내용을 전부 직접 수정을 해줄 것을 스스로 주장하십시요. 본 사무실에 연락하실 부분이 아닙니다.
FEE
상담
소개
| 민사
LAND
금융
| TAX
조세
소송
| 행정
헌법
노동
| 병역
여권
국적
| PAT
특허
상표
| 모욕
명예
훼손
| 연예
ART
TECH
| CRIME
형사
고발
| 관세
국제
거래
| USA
이민
VISA
| 이혼
상속
가사
| Korea
Aliens
SERVICE
| |
[OFFICE MAP] ↓